Pennsylvania Supreme Court agrees that factual issues could allow for civil liability against co-worker

On February 18, 2026, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s ruling reversing a Trial Court’s entry of summary judgment dismissing an injured man’s negligence lawsuit against his co-worker.

Brown v. Gaydos, begins as a result of September 1, 2016 incident where John Brown suffered injuries while working for American Concrete Solutions, Inc (ACS). Brown suffered crush injuries when the arm on a piece of industrial equipment, a skid loader, malfunctioned. There was no dispute that Brown was working for ACS at the time of injury and the workers’ compensation insurer for ACS paid benefits.

The skid loader was owned by George Gaydos, a part owner and a fellow employee at ACS. Factually significant, Gaydos owned, maintained, stored, and insured the skid loader individually and separate from his employment relationship with ACS. Gaydos occasionally loaned the skid loader to ACS for use in connection with ACS’s operations.

Section 72 of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act (77 P.S. § 72) provides immunity from civil liability to a co-employee whose negligence caused injuries to a co-worker, so long as the injuries occur while the co-employee was in the same employ as the injured worker and acting within the course and scope of employment at the time of the incident.

Brown filed a negligence lawsuit against Gaydos in his individual capacity arguing that because Gaydos maintained the skid loader outside of his work with ACS, inspected, maintained, stored, and insured the skid loader in that individual capacity, and that because Gaydos was not present at ACS at the time of injury, that Gaydos did not enjoy the protections of co-employee immunity. The Trial Court sided with Gaydos finding that he was a co-employee of Brown and, as a result, was automatically immune from civil liability under Section 72. A three (3) Judge panel of the Superior Court reversed finding a factual dispute existed as to whether Gaydos and Brown were acting “acting in the same employ” when Brown was injured. The Superior Court found facts presented by Brown could establish co-employee immunity does not apply because of the custody and control over the skid loader. It was also noted that because Gaydos was not on the ACS job site at the time Brown was injured raises additional course and scope questions preventing entry of summary judgment.

Gaydos sought review by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which was granted.

A majority of the Supreme Court Justices affirmed the Superior Court’s ruling citing it’s 1971 decision in Apple v. Reichert, holding that co-employee immunity applies to acts occurring when the alleged negligent actor is in the same employ as the injured worker and acting within the course and scope of their employment at the time of the worker’s injury. Brown had alleged that Gaydos was negligent in maintaining the skid loader outside of the co-workers’ employment relationship with ACS. Additionally, Gaydos was not on site when Brown was injured leaving a factual dispute as to course and scope of employment at the time of injury. If Brown’s position is accepted by the fact-finder, it is possible for a jury to conclude that co-employee immunity did not apply making entry of summary judgment improper.

In short, a co-worker is not automatically immune from civil liability simply because the injured worker is employed by and works for the same employer. A closer analysis must be given to whether the alleged negligence occurred within the co-employee relationship and whether the negligence occurred while both workers were acting within the course of scope of employment at the time of injury.